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A
mAbstract
In order to study the relationship between genes and diseases, the increasing
availability and sharing of phenotypic and genotypic data have been promoted as
an imperative within the scientific community. In parallel with data sharing practices
by clinicians and researchers, recent initiatives have been observed in which
individuals are sharing personal genomic data. The involvement of individuals in
such initiatives is facilitated by the increased accessibility of personal genomic data,
offered by private test providers along with availability of online networks. Personal
webpages and on-line data sharing platforms such as Consent to Research (Portable
Legal Consent), Free the Data, and Genomes Unzipped are being utilized to host and
share genotypes, electronic health records and family history uploaded by individuals.
Although personal genomic data sharing initiatives vary in nature, the emphasis
on the individuals’ control on their data in order to benefit research and ultimately
health care has seen as a key theme across these initiatives. In line with the growing
practice of personal genomic data sharing, this paper aims to shed light on the
potential challenges surrounding these initiatives. As in the course of these initiatives
individuals are solicited to individually balance the risks and benefits of sharing their
genomic data, their awareness of the implications of personal genomic data sharing
for themselves and their family members is a necessity. Furthermore, given the sensitivity
of genomic data and the controversies around their complete de-identifiability,
potential privacy risks and harms originating from unintended uses of data have
to be taken into consideration.Introduction
The decreasing costs of sequencing technologies (Hayden 2014) supported by recent
advancements in bioinformatics amounted to an improvement in genomic data pro-
duction. In light of the increasing availability of genomic data, data sharing and open
access policies were promoted by large international consortia in order to maximize
the use of generated datasets and enhance the statistical power of studies. Funding or-
ganizations also drafted policies to expand accessibility and use of datasets by requiring
researchers to incorporate data sharing plans in their fund-seeking proposals (Foster
and Sharp 2007; NIH 2014). As a consequence, central on-line databases such as the
database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP)a and the European Genome-phenome
Archiveb have been designated to host vast volumes of data either in a publicly access-
ible or controlled fashion.2015 Shabani and Borry; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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genomic databases (Knoppers et al. 2007; Peppercorn et al. 2012). The subsequent use
of genomic data originally accumulated for a single project gives a new twist to the
discussion on the adequacy of informed consent, and the need to inform research
participants about potential risks, benefits, research goals and withdrawal options. This
developments made some to conclude that in the age of data sharing, traditional paper-
based one-off consent is stretched to its limits (Hayden 2012). Additionally, ensuring
privacy of participants appears as an emerging challenge. Although de-identification of
data has been traditionally seen as a response to privacy concerns, it might fall short in
the context of genomic data (Kaye 2012), given that DNA is a unique identifier.
Although responsibilities of researchers and biobanks in fostering sharing practices
are extensively pronounced, also individuals are appealed to contribute to such initia-
tives (Dolgin 2010; Hand 2010; Kaye 2012). Web-based personal genomic data sharing
or “crowdsourcing” research (Barry 2009) initiatives encourage the provision of per-
sonal genomic data and health-related information by individuals for research purposes.
The involvement of individuals in such personal data sharing initiatives is facilitated by
the increased accessibility of personal genomic data, offered by commercial test pro-
viders along with the availability of interactive information technology. Promises to
utilize potentials of personal genomic data motivate individuals to take part in sharing
activities.
Various personal genomic data sharing initiatives are being organized differently, ac-
cording to their missions and goals. In some occasions, personal genomic data sharing
is epitomized in the form of posting personal genomic data or those of family members
at publicly accessible personal webpages. For example, the idea of Corpasome refers to
an effort by Corpas family to publicly share the personal genomic data belonging to five
members of the family (Corpas 2013). In these situations personal genomic data is usu-
ally posted in order to broaden access and enable subsequent analysis and interpret-
ation by various interested researchers.
In other occasions, intermediary data sharing platforms may facilitate the personal
genomic data sharing by initiating projects to host and share genotype data and
medical information. Thereby, individuals who have access to their genomic data and
medical records can upload their data into the designated webpages. Free the datac,
Genomerad and PatientsLikeMee are examples of these projects. In the framework of
these platforms, data collection and sharing policies have often been delineated within
the privacy policy statements or consent forms. In addition, in some projects such as
Free the Data, participants are asked to take part in the surveys and to answer various
questions regarding their health status or any existing health conditions in the family
history.
Despite the observed differences, the emphasis on the individuals’ control on their
data and the possibility of sharing data have been seen as a key theme across these
initiatives. To enable individuals to control their personal data, customized sharing
options have been provided to participants. Such strategy was designed with the aim to
respond to the inadequacy of employing one-size-fits-all approach towards consent and
privacy preferences (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2013). Thereby, individuals are
asked to determine who should have access to their data and for which purposes (Kaye
et al. 2013).
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by web-based tools may address a challenge of maintaining contact with participants
(Wee 2013). As individuals could opt to be re-contacted by third party researchers in
the course of personal data sharing, collection of more detailed real-time information
upon the request of researchers has been advanced as a plausible practice (McEwen
et al. 2013). Such “dynamic phenotyping” (Lunshof et al. 2010) supported by web-based
personal genetic data sharing has been presented as a potential response to the need
for linking and collecting phenotypic and other health related information in longitu-
dinal prospective studies in which genomic data are generated.
Ethical and legal dilemmas faced by researcher-driven or biobank-driven genomic
data sharing have been extensively discussed in the literature (Fullerton et al. 2010;
Harris et al. 2012; Kaye et al. 2009; Knoppers et al. 2011). A few studies also have
reflected on attitudes of consumers concerning sharing personal genomic data (Lee
et al. 2013) and policies employed by direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies re-
garding their research activities fueled by consumer data (Esposito and Goodman 2009;
Harris et al. 2013; Howard et al. 2010). However, little has been published about the
ethical and legal challenges surrounding growing web-based personal genomic data
sharing (Bloss 2013; Angrist 2014; Mathews and Jamal 2014). To bridge this gap, this
paper investigates the challenges surrounding such initiatives in view of three examples
of current web-based personal genomic data sharing projects, namely Consent to
research (Portable Legal Consent)f, Free the Datac and Genomes Unzipped (GNZ)g
(Table 1). Two ultimate goals will guide our study. Firstly, we aim to analyze the legal
and ethical dilemmas linked with personal genomic data sharing and assess existing
safeguards. Secondly, we aim to provide insight into how these challenges have been
tackled in the framework of these three projects. To this end, the first part of this art-
icle highlights the main features of the three projects on the basis of consent forms,
privacy policy statements, and relevant information retrieved between October 2013
and February 2014, from the website of these projects. In the second part, some
concerns arising from personal genomic data sharing, in particular re-identification
risks, legal safeguards and governance mechanisms, implications for family members,
limitations of individuals’ control on their genomic data and potential responses of the
three projects to these concerns, are discussed.Table 1 Features of three web-based personal genomic data sharing projects
Name of the project Type of data they collect Goals
Consent to research
(Portable Legal Consent)
exome, whole-genome sequence,
electronic health records or
family history
To create large datasets of user-contributed
health and genomic data that are easier
to re-use, to promote collaborations and
innovation around health and genomic
research
Free the data Mutation reports for BRCA1/2, a
variety of health information
To invite clinicians and individuals to donate
their mutations and associated clinical data
in order to be deposited in ClinVar and
other open-access databases
Genomes unzipped (GNZ) Genotypes obtained from various
genetic test providers, release of
more data up to and including
whole-genome sequencing is
envisioned
To use the data provided by participants
and other GNZ community members both
to perform scientific analyses and as a basis
for communicating about genetics to a
broader audience
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In order to shed light on the main features of the three web-based personal genomic
data sharing projects under study, the consent form, privacy policy statements, and
other relevant information extracted from the websites of these projects have been con-
sulted. As indicated in the following, personal genomic data sharing practices share
some similarities such as placing individuals in the control of their data and utilizing
the web-based vehicles to facilitate personal data sharing, along with stressing the
significance of such contribution on expediting research. But they also differ in various
aspects including missions, scale, and privacy models.
Consent to research
Consent to Research is a project initiated by Sage Bionetworksh, a non-profit research
organization based in Seattle, U.S. which aims to redefine “biomedical research
through open systems, incentives, and norms.” To accomplish these goals, Sage
Bionetworks adopted the Portable Legal Consent (PLC)i mechanism as a part of a
governance project that includes terms of use, privacy policies, and data use agree-
ments as well as informed consent and legal terms. As elaborated within the PLC,
the project endeavors “to create large datasets of user-contributed health and gen-
omic data that are easier to re-use, to promote collaborations and innovation around
health and genomic research and to allow any volunteer to play an active role in the
research process”. In pursuit of this mission, Sage Bionetworks collects genomic, pheno-
typic, observational, health-related and other forms of information from volunteer
individuals, to feed multiple research studies. The first study of this project namely Self-
Contributed Cohort for Common Genetic Research (SCC-CGR) is currently closed for
enrollment and the publication of results and data (aggregate level) is expected in the near
futuref.
Upon participation in this project, individuals may agree to grant rights to research,
redistribute, publish and commercialize their data to “Qualified Researchers”. Accord-
ing to the PLC: “Data collected will be made available, for research purposes, to a broad
variety of users who have agreed to be bound by a contract and to specific terms and
conditions that include use of the data in an ethical manner, to do no harm, not re-
identify or re-contact individuals, and to make their research results openly available to
the general public”i.
In addition, in an on-line educational video that cannot be bypassed, potential par-
ticipants learn about the importance of wide data sharing to be materialized in an
ethically sound fashionj. In terms of disclosure, PLC provides participants with an
option to share their data in a de-identified fashion, unless otherwise desired. Add-
itionally, a non-comprehensive list of potential risks and discomforts is incorporated
within PLC about unintended uses of shared data by third parties that could conse-
quently harm participants or their family members. The unintended uses of data
have been further illustrated by a few examples such as using data in a discriminatory
fashion against data subjects or their family members in the employment, insurance
or financial services setting. In terms of benefits, it has been articulated that the con-
tribution of personal data would not yield any direct benefit for the participants,
given the fact that society and science at large are the conceived beneficiaries of such
initiatives.
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Free the datac is a project initiated by a consortium of organizations, managed by
Genetic Alliance which is a non-profit health advocacy organization. Free the Data aims
to facilitate discovery of “association between mutations and health outcomes” via
entering BRCA1/2 reports into the public database of ClinVar which is a free, publicly
accessible archive of reports and information on gene variants. Individuals who receive
a report entailing a mutation in BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene are invited by Free the Data to
provide a variety of personal health information and share their medical reports in a
public database, in order to realize “a better understanding of disease, higher quality pa-
tient care, and improved human health”k. Besides personal medical reports, patients are
also offered the options to upload reports from their legal minors or other family
members to the websitel .For the latter, however, it is required to observe the wishes of
family members over submission of their data in the website. In addition, in the frame-
work of the Sharing Clinical Reports Project (SCRP) which is the clinician arm of the
Free the Data project, clinicians could submit their patients’ BRCA1/2 reports in a de-
identified fashionm.
Individuals are enabled to indicate their sharing preferences towards a variety of
potential data users grouped as “Advocacy and Support Groups” and “Medical
Researchers”, and are able to modify their choices at any time (Nguyen and Terry
2013). According to the “About Us” webpage of the project, “Free the Data uses a
participant-centric platform that allows you to decide how much you share, and with
whom. Using privacy and security technology similar to banking, you have control over
your health information and can set your own sharing, privacy, and data access
preferences”n.
Genomes unzipped
Genomes Unzipped (GNZ) is a project initiated by a group of active researchers in vari-
ous fields of genetics, as well as specialists in the legal and public health issues sur-
rounding new genomic technologies. In this project, members of GNZ publicly publish
their own genomic data believing that “doing good science means releasing complete
data for others to investigate”g. Generating “tools for analysis of raw genetic data” along
with “providing independent, unbiased assessments of the technical validity and clinical
utility of a variety of genetic testing products” are included in the perceived outcomes
of the project within the Participant Information Form.
Additionally, by endorsing large open-access non-anonymous research databases such
as the Personal Genome Projecto, GNZ encourages individuals to participate in an open
research project in the benefit of the public good. Although, at this moment participa-
tion of GNZ is limited to 15–20 core members who have expertise in an area related to
the analysis of genetic data and their family members, it has been envisioned that indi-
viduals from the broader community who have access to their genetic data will be
invited to share their data in the future. According to the webpage of GNZ project, the
members of the project hope that releasing their data publicly “will help to guide useful
discussions about genetic privacy and the benefits, risks, and limitations of genetic
information in general”, as they “believe that many of the fears expressed about the
dangers of genetic information are exaggerated, and see this project as an opportunity
to have a constructive public discussion about the truth behind these fears”g. GNZ, in
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takes a rather different approach compared to the two other projects by informing par-
ticipants that no level of privacy, anonymity or confidentiality is guaranteed. Similar to
PLC, a list of potential risks and discomforts associated with personal genomic data
sharing has been laid out in the Participant Information Form of GNZ project to be
factored in the process of decision making by participants.
Concerns related to web-based personal genomic data sharing projects
Activities of web-based personal genomic data sharing initiatives may raise a number of
ethical and legal challenges. The following part addresses the paramount concerns
associated with such initiatives and assesses the current responses of the studied
projects to those concerns.
Identifiability and Re-identification
The potential accessibility of linkable data augments the concerns of re-identification
of shared personal genomic data. This was recently shown in a study (Gymrek et al.
2013) in which researchers could successfully recover surnames of five de-identified
participants of the 1000 Genomes projectp by profiling short tandem repeats on the Y
chromosome and by querying recreational genetic genealogy databases. The integration
of genomic data with health information and electronic medical records is another
element that increases the possibility of re-identification of data subjects (Esposito and
Goodman 2009).
In line with the privacy concerns and demonstrated risks of re-identification, the
studied projects attempt to inform participants regarding privacy risks associated with
broad personal genomic data sharing. According to PLC, although participants could
opt-in for a de-identified data sharing, the risk of re-identification and loss of privacy
due to erroneous or malicious identity disclosure should be considered. Free the data
project also warns participants within the privacy policy statement about the impossi-
bility of guaranteeing absolute privacy due to the fact that “new vulnerabilities and
threats appear every day”. The project promises participants to “minimize risks to a
tolerable level”, as it is not possible to eliminate data protection risks thoroughly. On
the other hand, the GNZ project favors the non-anonymous personal data sharing
approach, stating that “given the ease with which a dedicated snoop could obtain
genetic information surreptitiously (via shed skin, hair or saliva, for instance), some of
us argue that the whole notion of genetic privacy is illusory anyway – while releasing
our data online makes it easier for people to get hold of it, this is a difference of degree
rather than kind”g.
However, the implications of disclosure of re-identification risks by personal data
sharing projects are matter of discussion. One can argue that by signing an open
consent (Lunshof et al. 2008), encompassing, among others, potential risks of re-
identification, participants implicitly relinquish their privacy and confidentiality rights
over the shared data. According to the open consent model, de-identifiability of
genomic data is a far-fetched promise, therefore participants should be prepared to
embrace the risks concomitant with genomic data sharing (Lunshof et al. 2008).
Even if signing such a consent form removes potential legal responsibilities from the
shoulder of data sharing platforms towards participants, this should not be seen as an
Shabani and Borry Life Sciences, Society and Policy  (2015) 11:3 Page 7 of 13ethical approval for re-identification attempts. In the aftermath of the recent re-
identification demonstrations (Gymrek et al. 2013; Homer et al. 2008), concerns have
been raised by, inter alia, the actual participants of personal genomic data sharing pro-
jects pointing out that the non-consensual re-identification attempts are ethically repre-
hensible (Meyer 2013). It has been argued that the consent of individuals to participate
despite the potential risks of re-identification should not be construed as consenting to
re-identification per se. “Even if the consent form signed at the time of the original
collection includes a disclaimer that absolute anonymity cannot be guaranteed, re-
identifying the DNA sample later represents a new collection, one that has been under-
taken without any consent” (Wilson 2013). In essence, to re-identify individuals, shared
genotypes (and associated data such as gender, age or disease being studied) should
match against available reference genotypes which contain personal datasets with
identifiers. Alternatively they should link to non-genetic databases such as data in
health-care, administrative, criminal or disaster response databases (Lowrance and
Collins 2007). Following either of these routes would result in associating de-identified
personal data with variety of identifiable information, while the consent of data subjects
is lacking.
Therefore, in order to respect rights of research participants, data sharing projects
that engage in de-identified personal data sharing activities, should craft sufficient
mechanisms to reduce the risks of re-identification in accordance with their data
stewardship responsibilities. In addition, third party users should be warned against the
ethical and potential legal repercussions of re-identification attempts due to the viola-
tion of participants’ rights.
Legal safeguards and Governance mechanism
Besides the re-identification risks, sharing personal genomic data may incur risks for
harms on participants. In this regard, PLC and GNZ canvas a list of potential harms
stemming from publicly sharing personal genetic data, mentioning that the evolving na-
ture of genomics research makes it impossible to predict the breadth of the risks or
their magnitude. Some of the included risks for harms appear rather remote such as
“synthesizing DNA strings and placing them at a crime scene” by malicious users.
However, other examples such as discriminatory use of data against individuals or their
family members by employers or insurance companies seem within the reach. Although
the effort of data sharing projects in candidly informing participants about potential
risks and discomforts is necessary, it still needs to be coupled with legal and ethical
safeguards if harms occur (Prainsack and Buyx 2013).
The potential legal responses to the harms associated with personal genomic data
sharing vary across jurisdictions. In terms of discriminatory uses of data, for instance,
PLC and GNZ inform participants that existing legal protections may not be compre-
hensive. As it is stated within the Participant Information Form (GNZ): “Although
some countries have laws that prohibit certain forms of genetic discrimination, these
laws may not apply to you, may not protect against all forms of discrimination or may
not stop a third party from discrimination against you even where it is prohibited by
law”. This may beg the question concerning the sufficiency and effectiveness of current
legal and ethical safeguards in shielding participants against potential harms (Weil et al.
2013). This is crucial mainly because the existing legal and ethical privacy safeguards
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records outside the confidential relationship of researchers-individuals. “[...] as patients
become more empowered to share their data to achieve greater medical benefit from it,
and as we move to more seamlessly map between DNA and more easily acquired high-
dimensional phenotypic data to predict with greater ease a greater diversity of human
behaviors and disease risks, laws must also evolve to ensure that the rights of patients
are protected. The shift to a more open personal data environment and a greater par-
ticipation of informed patients will thus need to be accompanied by stricter and
broader anti-discrimination regulations” (Schadt 2012).
That said, initiating personal genomic data sharing projects despite the acknowledged
shortcomings in current legal safeguards and governance and oversight mechanisms
may raise concerns regarding protection of research participants.
Personal genomic data sharing: Not an entirely personal decision
The hereditary nature of genomic data may transform the personal decision of sharing
genetic data into one with familial ramifications. As in the Participant Information
Form, GNZ puts it: “Although in many instances any conclusions that may be inferred
from your publicly available information may be speculative with respect to you, and
even less predictive with respect to your family members, the complete set and magni-
tude of the risks that the public availability of this information poses to you and your
relatives are not known at this time”q. In particular, genomic data sharing by individuals
may reveal a spectrum of unexpected health and non-health-related information with
significance for immediate family members. For instance, by analyzing publicly available
personal genetic data, third parties could unveil the elevated or diminished risks for a
disease or other trait or shed light on the family lineage and ethnicity. As a result, this
information “may alter how individuals view themselves and their family of origin”
(Doukas and Berg 2001).
Also, in the framework of PLC, individuals are notified that the provided list of risks
and discomforts could address both participants and their family members. The poten-
tial risks for relatives are further elaborated: “If a privacy breach results in the disclos-
ure of information pertaining to an inherited mutation, for example, that information
may harm not only the individual research participant but also other genetically related
people. Under such circumstances, an individual’s choice to participate in research may
result in group discrimination or stigmatization” (Weil et al. 2013).
In response to this concern, both GNZ and PLC strongly encourage participants to
discuss the project and pertinent risks with their immediate family members.
Notwithstanding, at this moment no mechanism exists to ensure that such consultation
is conducted. Moreover, it is expected that the likely conflict of interests between family
members concerning sharing genetic data would bring vexing issues of data ownership
and scope of privacy rights to the fore and require further investigations.
Limitations of individuals’ control on their genomic data
Placing individuals in control of their data is seen as a recurring theme across the
studied projects. In line with this goal, participants are solicited to individually balance
risks and benefits of personal genomic data sharing in congruence with their heteroge-
neous risk-benefit preferences.
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magnitude of potential risks such as privacy breaches. However, one may legitimately
argue conducting such risk and benefit analysis requires holding sufficient knowledge
concerning complex and yet unknown potentials of personal genomic data sharing,
which general public may lack (Steinsbekk et al. 2013). “by building increasingly large
databases and collecting both genetic and extensive phenotypic information, however,
associations may later be made that were not clear or possible to predict, and these
might constitute findings (about personality or behavior, for instance) that an individual
might have wanted to protect or conceal” (Esposito and Goodman 2009).
Complexities of the information extracted from genomic data have been illustrated in
the case of the public release of Dr. James Watson’s sequenced genome in 2008. In
course of this public release, on the basis of Dr. Watson’s request, all the gene informa-
tion about apolipoprotein E (ApoE) had been removed due to concerns regarding a
shown association between this gene and late-onset Alzheimer’s disease (LOAD).
Despite undertaking the precautionary measures, a subsequent study suggested the
insufficiency of the deletion of the APOE gene information to prevent a risk prediction
for LOAD: “the deletion of the APOE gene information only may not prevent accurate
prediction of Dr. Watson’s risk for LOAD conveyed by APOE risk alleles. Specifically,
linkage disequilibrium (LD) between one or multiple polymorphisms and APOE can be
used to predict APOE status using advanced computational tools. Therefore, simply
blanking out genotypes at known risk factors is generally not sufficient if the aim is to
hide genetic information at these loci” (Nyholt et al. 2009).
The investigated personal genomic data sharing projects attempt to familiarize partic-
ipants with the implications of their contribution through consent and the privacy
policy statements. It is however unclear whether such documents are sufficient in
informing individuals about potential risks of data sharing. Results of studies indicate
that participants often have difficulty in comprehending lengthy consent forms, under-
standing confidentiality issues and recalling what they did consent for (Ormond et al.
2009; Robinson et al. 2013). Likewise, designing privacy policy statements to fulfill in-
formational needs of participants and specify their privacy preferences has been seen to
be a challenging effort. As Cranor et al. note, the underlying reasons for such chal-
lenges may include that “privacy policies are complex, user privacy preferences are
often complex and nuanced, users tend to have little experience articulating their priv-
acy preferences, users are generally unfamiliar with much of the terminology used by
privacy experts, and users often do not understand the privacy-related consequences of
their behavior” (Cranor et al. 2006).
Presumably, barriers in adequately informing individuals regarding personal data
sharing led some projects to target highly educated or more motivated and empowered
individuals. Alternatively, participants may be required to pass an “entrance test” before
widely sharing their data, a model that employed by Personal Genome Project (Lunshof
et al. 2008). However, this approach has been criticized on the grounds that the sample
may not be representative of whole society as such, imposing a selection bias (Janssens
and Kraft 2012).
To address the need for adequately informing participants, some personal genomic
data sharing projects have referred to supplementary mechanisms. For instance, GNZ
encourages participants to seek advice from their physician or other qualified health
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of knowledge and experience of general health care professionals in genetics may hin-
der such consultation. In this regard, a survey of consumers of Direct-to-Consumer
personal genomics indicated “the majority of participants reported that their healthcare
provider had limited ability to understand and insufficient expertise to interpret their
results” (Lee et al. 2013).
Furthermore, the option to withdraw data from the research is central to being in
control of personal genomic data. However, sharing data through the web imposes sig-
nificant barriers on a complete withdrawal of shared data and could make personal data
sharing an irrevocable decision.
Concluding remarks
The imperative to broad genetic data sharing grows stronger with time. Along with
data sharing by researchers, various initiatives invite individuals to participate in
personal genomic data sharing. In those initiatives, individuals are encouraged to take
control of their genetic data and utilize web-based tools to share their data according
to their privacy comfort. It has been argued that by enabling such an informed choice,
individuals will personally balance risks and benefits of personal genomic data sharing
(Karczewski et al. 2012). Nevertheless, inherent limitations on controllability of gen-
omic data, once publicly shared, cast doubts on this argument. As it has been noted,
“…the notion of consenting to research use of data loses meaning when the use can in-
volve many unknown researchers and uses in perpetuity. Such open-ended use of data
renders the well-established right to withdraw consent to collection and use of personal
data for research meaningless” (Vayena et al. 2013). Moreover, the evolving nature of
genomics research makes it hard to predict the breadth of information that could be
extracted from sequenced data in the future and magnitude of risks associated with
such disclosures.
Some have stressed on the necessity of communication of methodological limitations
of research carried out by some personal data sharing initiatives to their participants
and pointed to the current shortcomings in accomplishing this task (Janssens and Kraft
2012). This imperative should be extended to the provision of an accurate account of
limitations associated with governance of personal genomic data sharing projects and
safeguards to protect rights of participants. To this end, it is suggested to employ
adequate communication tools in order to inform potential participants regarding such
limitations. Thereby, participants would receive a fair opportunity to consider existing
limitations and risks in the face of the highlighted benefits of data sharing for research.
This approach will ultimately lead to a higher level of transparency and trust among
participants. In addition, the evolving potentials of genomics and bioinformatics render
the risks of re-identification and privacy breaches as moving targets, requiring an
ongoing investigation of the sufficiency of the pertinent legal and ethical safeguards in
place.
Furthermore, given the hereditary nature of genomic data, personal genomic data
sharing should not be portrayed as merely a personal decision regardless of the poten-
tial ramifications for family members. As the Presidential Commission noted within the
recent report, “Respect for persons supports giving persons the opportunity to share
their whole genome sequence information for scientific advancement, subject to strong
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safeguard their privacy as well as that of others, by giving thoughtful consideration to
how sharing their whole genome sequencing data in a public forum might expose them
to unwanted incursions upon their privacy and that of their immediate relatives. To be
indifferent to the implications of disclosure of sensitive data and information about
one’s self is to act irresponsibly” (Presidential Commission for the study of bioethical is-
sues 2012).Endnotes
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